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The possibility that the euro area might break up was being raised even before the single currency
existed.  These scenarios were then lent new life five or six years on, when appreciation of the euro
and problems of slow growth in various member states led politicians to blame the European Central
Bank for disappointing economic performance.  Highly-placed European officials reportedly discussed
the possibility that one or more participants might withdraw from the monetary union.  How seriously
should we take these scenarios?  And how significant would be the economic and political consequences?
It is unlikely, I argue here, that one or more members of the euro area will leave in the next ten years;
total disintegration of the euro area is even more unlikely. While other authors have minimized the
technical difficulties of reintroducing a national currency, I suggest that those technical difficulties
would be quite formidable.  Nor is it certain that the economic problems of the participating member
states would be significantly ameliorated by abandoning the euro.  And even if there are immediate
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1.  Introduction 
  The possibility of the breakup of the euro area was already being mooted even 
before the single currency existed.
2  These scenarios were then lent new life five or six 
years on, when appreciation of the euro against the dollar and problems of slow growth in 
various member states led politicians to blame the European Central Bank for 
disappointing economic performance.
3  Highly-placed officials, including possibly 
members of the governing council of the German central bank, reportedly discussed the 
possibility that one or more participants might withdraw from the monetary union.
4  How 
seriously should we take these scenarios?  And how much should we care – how 
significant, in other words, would be the economic and political consequences? 
  The conclusion of the author is that it is unlikely that one or more members of the 
euro area will leave in the next ten years and that the total disintegration of the euro area 
is more unlikely still.
5  The technical difficulties of reintroducing a national currency 
should not be minimized.  Nor is it obvious that the economic problems of the 
participating member states can be significantly ameliorated by abandoning the euro, 
                                                 
1 An earlier version was prepared for the euro preconference at the NBER Summer Institute, July 12, 2007.   
I thank Alberto Alesina for comments, Mark Hallerberg for help with data, and Jeffrey Greenbaum for 
research assistance. 
2 See e.g. Garber (1998) and  Scott (1998). 
3 Appreciation of the euro against the dollar (and against Asian currencies pegged to the dollar) first 
occurred in 2002-4.  In June 2005 Italian welfare minister Roberto Maroni declared that “the euro has to 
go” and called for the reintroduction of the lira.  Then-prime minister Silvio Berlusconi followed by calling 
the euro “a disaster.” 
4 Bundesbank president Axel Weber dismissed as “absurd” reports that he had taken part in such a 
meeting.”  Expatia (2005), p.1. 
5 Note that I have violated the first rule of forecasting: give them a forecast or give them a date, but never 
give them both.  The point is that over horizons longer than ten years so many things could change that 
forecasting becomes prohibitively difficult.  But I turn to the question of long-term developments below.       2
although neither can this possibility be dismissed.  And even if there are immediate 
economic benefits, there may be longer-term economic costs, and political costs of an 
even more serious nature.  Still, as Cohen (2000) puts it, “In a world of sovereign 
states….nothing can be regarded as truly irreversible.”  Policy analysts should engage in 
contingency planning, even if the contingency in question has a low probability. 
The remainder of this paper considers such scenarios in more detail.  While it is 
widely argued that the technical and legal obstacles to a country unilaterally 
reintroducing its national currency are surmountable, it will be argued here that the 
associated difficulties could in fact be quite serious.  To be sure, there are multiple 
historical examples of members of monetary unions introducing a national currency.  It 
has also been suggested that the legal problems associated with the redenomination of 
contracts can be overcome, as they were when the ruble zone broke up or when Germany 
replaced the mark with the reichsmark in 1923-4.  But changing from an old money to a 
new one is more complicated today than in Germany in the 1920s or the former Soviet 
Union in the 1990s.  Computer code must be rewritten.  Automatic teller machines must 
be reprogrammed.  Advance planning will be required for the process to go smoothly, as 
was the case with the introduction of the physical euro in 2002.  Moreover, abandoning 
the euro will presumably entail lengthy political debate and passage of a bill by a national 
parliament or legislature, also over an extended period of time.  And, all the while, there 
will be an incentive for agents anticipating the redenomination of their claims into the 
national currency, followed by depreciation of the latter, to rush out of domestic banks 
and financial assets, threatening a banking and financial-market collapse.  Limiting the   3
negative repercussions would be a major technical and policy challenge for a government 
contemplating abandonment of the euro. 
  The economic obstacles revolve around the question of how debt servicing costs, 
interest rates spreads, and interest-rate-sensitive forms of economic activity would 
respond to a country’s departure from the euro area.
6  A widespread presumption is that 
departure from the euro area would be associated with a significant rise in spreads and 
debt-servicing costs.  But further reflection suggests that the consequences will depend 
on why a country leaves (the defector could conceivably be a Germany concerned with 
politicization of ECB policy and inflationary bias rather than an Italy facing slow growth 
and an exploding public debt).  They will depend on whether credible alternatives to the 
ECB and Stability Pact are put in place at the national level (whether national central 
bank independence is strengthened and credible fiscal reforms are adopted at the same 
time the exchange rate is reintroduced and depreciated).  It seems likely that there would 
be economic costs but that these could be minimized by appropriate institutional reforms. 
The political costs are likely to be particularly serious.  The Treaty of European 
Union makes no provision for exit.  Exit by one member would raise doubts about the 
future of the monetary union and likely precipitate a further shift out of euro-
denominated assets, which would not please the remaining members.  It might damage 
the balance sheets of banks in other countries with investments in the one abandoning the 
euro.  Diplomatic tension and political acrimony would follow, and cooperation on non-
monetary issues would suffer.  The defector would be relegated to second-tier status in 
intra-European discussions of nonmonetary issues.  And, insofar as they attach value to 
                                                 
6 There is also the question of whether other EU member states would retaliate against a country 
reintroducing and depreciating its national currency with trade sanctions – considered below.   4
their participation in this larger process of European integration, incumbents will be 
reluctant to leave. 
 
2.  Scenarios 
  Different countries could abandon the euro for different reasons.  One can 
imagine a country like Portugal, suffering from high labor costs and chronic slow growth, 
reintroducing the escudo in the effort to engineer a sharp real depreciation and export its 
way back to full employment.  Alternatively, one can imagine a country like Germany, 
upset that the ECB has come under pressure from governments to relax its commitment 
to price stability, reintroducing the deutschemark in order to avoid excessive inflation.    
These different scenarios would have different implications for whether defection 
implies breakup – that is, for whether one country’s leaving reduces the incentive for 
others to remain.  In the case of Portuguese defection the residual members might suffer a 
further loss of export competitiveness, while in the event of German exit they might find 
their competitiveness enhanced. Specifically, if other countries are similarly experiencing 
high unemployment associated with inadequate international competitiveness, then 
Portugal’s leaving will aggravate the pain felt by the others and may lead them to follow 
suit – but Germany’s leaving may have no or even the opposite effect.  Similarly, if 
discomfort with the inflationary stance of ECB policy is shared by other countries, then 
Germany’s leaving, by removing one voice and vote for price stability, may heighten the 
incentive for others to do likewise.  
More generally, if the country that leaves is an outlier in terms of its preferences 
over central bank policy, then its defection might better enable the remaining participants   5
to secure an ECB policy more to their liking, in which case the likelihood of further 
defection and general breakup would be reduced.  Disagreements over the stance of 
policy being an obvious reason why a participating member state would be disaffected, 
one might think that the defector would automatically be an outlier in terms of its 
preferences over central bank policy.  But this is by no means certain: countries whose 
preferences differ insignificantly from those of other members could choose to defect for 
other reasons, for example in response to an exceptionally severe asymmetric shock, or 
because of disagreements over non-economic issues.
7     
And if the country that leaves is small, this would be unlikely to much affect the 
incentives of other members to continue operating a monetary union that is valued 
primarily for its corollary benefits.  The contribution of the euro to enhancing price 
stability would not be significantly diminished by the defection of one small member.
8  
The impetus for financial deepening ascribed to the single currency would not be 
significantly diminished.
9  If Portugal left the euro area, in other words, would the other 
members notice?  Even if it used its monetary autonomy to engineer a substantial real 
depreciation, would its euro-area neighbors experience a significant loss of 
competitiveness and feel serious pain? 
If, on the other hand, Germany defected, the size of the euro area would decline 
by more than a quarter.  This would imply significant diminution of the scale of the 
market over which the benefits of the euro were felt in terms of increased price 
transparency and financial deepening.  Countries balancing these benefits against the 
                                                 
7 These issues were analyzed in an influential early article by Alesina and Grilli (1993). 
8 The literature on price transparency and the euro is reviewed by Martha (2003). 
9 On the stimulus to the development of European financial markets, see Bishop (2000) and Biais et al. 
(2006).  On the corollary benefits of monetary union more generally, see Mongelli and Vega (2006).   6
costs of being denied their optimal national monetary policy might find themselves tipped 
against membership.  Defection by a few could then result in general disintegration. 
  In practice, a variety of asymmetric shocks could slow growth and raise 
unemployment in a euro area member state and create pressure for a real depreciation.  
The shocks that have attracted the most attention are those highlighted in Blanchard’s 
model of rotating slumps (Blanchard 2006).  The advent of the euro has brought 
credibility benefits to members whose commitment to price stability was previously least 
firm and where interest rates were previously high.
10  Enhanced expectations of price 
stability have brought down domestic interest rates, bidding up bond, stock and housing 
prices.  Foreign capital has flooded in to take advantage of this convergence play.  The 
cost of capital having declined, investment rises in the short run.  Households feeling 
positive wealth effects, consumption rises as well.  The capital inflow has as its 
counterpart a current account deficit.  In the short run the result is an economic boom, 
driven first and foremost by residential construction, with falling unemployment and 
rising wages.   
But once the capital stock adjusts to the higher levels implied by the lower cost of 
capital, the boom comes to an end.  Unless the increase in capital stock significantly 
raises labor productivity (which is unlikely insofar as much of the preceding period’s 
investment took the form of residential construction), the result is a loss of cost 
competitiveness.  The country then faces slow growth, chronic high unemployment and 
grinding deflation, as weak labor market conditions force wages to fall relative to those 
prevailing elsewhere in the euro area.  The temptation, then, is to leave the euro zone so 
                                                 
10 Benefits that in some sense reflect the operation of the barriers to exit described below.   7
that monetary policy can be used to reverse the erosion of competitiveness with a 
“healthy” dose of inflation.  
  This particular scenario has attracted attention because it suggests that the 
tensions that could eventually result in defections from the euro area are intrinsic to the 
operation of the monetary union.  It suggests that the intra-euro-area divergences that are 
their source are direct consequences of the monetary union’s operation.  This story tracks 
the experience of Portugal since the mid-1990s – first boom, then overvaluation, and 
finally slumpl.  There are signs of similar problems in Italy, where the difficulties caused 
by slow growth are compounded by the existence of a heavy public debt, and in Spain, 
which experienced many of the same dynamics as Portugal.  The implication is that 




3.  Economic Barriers to Exit 
  But would reintroducing the national currency and following with a sharp 
depreciation against the euro in fact help to solve these countries’ competitiveness and 
debt problems?  The presumption in much of the literature is negative.
12  A country like 
Italy where slow growth combined with high inherited debt/GDP ratios to raise the 
specter of debt unsustainability (that it would become necessary to restructure the debt or 
for taxpayers and transfer recipients to make inconceivable sacrifices) might be tempted 
                                                 
11 One can also argue that Greece and Slovenia will have learned from the problems of Portugal, Spain and 
Italy, and that they will take preventive measures – aggressively tightening fiscal policy, for example, to 
prevent capital inflows from fueling an unsustainable construction-led investment boom and leading to a 
consequent loss of competitiveness.  In this view, the negative shocks experienced by the first cohort of 
convergence economies may not be felt by their successors. 
12 See for example Gros (2007).   8
to reintroduce the lira as a way of securing a more inflationary monetary policy and 
depreciating away the value of the debt; but doing so would result in credit-rating 
downgrades, higher sovereign spreads and an increase in interest costs, as investors 
anticipate and react to the government’s actions.  A country like Portugal where high real 
wages combine with the absence of exchange rate independence to produce chronic high 
unemployment might be tempted to reintroduce the escudo as a way of securing a more 
expansionary monetary policy and pushing down labor costs; but doing so will only 
result in higher wage inflation, as workers anticipate and react to the government’s 
actions.  Estimates in Blanchard (2006) suggest that Portugal would require a 25 per cent 
real depreciation in order to restore its competitiveness.
13  It is not clear if the government 
sought to engineer this through a substantial nominal depreciation that workers would 
look the other way.  Observers pointing to these effects conclude that exiting might not 
be especially beneficial for a country with high debts or high unemployment.  To the 
contrary, the principal obstacle to exiting the euro area in this view is that doing so may 
have significant economic costs. 
  Yet one can also imagine circumstances in which reintroducing the national 
currency might constitute a useful treatment.  Assume that Portuguese workers are 
prepared to accept a reduction in their real wages but confront a coordination problem: 
they are willing to accept a reduction only if other workers or unions accept a reduction, 
perhaps because they care about relative wages.
14  Under these circumstances there will 
be a reluctance to move first, and wage adjustment will be suboptimally slow.  Then a 
                                                 
13 Absent further divergences in productivity growth. 
14 Or because the aggregate rate of growth, from which everyone benefits, depends on the national average 
level of costs.  One can imagine still other formulations of this coordination problem.  A survey is Cooper 
(1999).   9
monetary-cum-exchange-rate policy that jumps up the price level, reducing real wages 
across the board, may be welfare enhancing; this is the so-called “daylight savings time” 
argument for a flexible exchange rate.  Importantly, in the circumstances described here 
there will be no incentive for individual workers or unions to push for higher wages to 
offset the increase in prices.  The lower real wages obtained as a result of depreciating the 
newly-reintroduced currency deliver the economy to the same full employment 
equilibrium that would have resulted from years of grinding deflation, only faster. 
  Note the assumption here: that whatever caused real wages to get out of line in the 
first place is not intrinsic to the economy, so that the problem will not recur.  Thus, the 
Portuguese example contemplated here is described under the assumption that real wages 
have fallen out of line for reasons extrinsic to the operation of the economy – for example, 
irrational exuberance on the part of workers in the run-up to Stage III of the Maastricht 
process, something that will not recur.  If, on the other hand, real wages are too high 
because of the existence of domestic distortions, for example the presence of powerful 
trade unions that exclusively value the welfare of their employed members, then it is 
implausible that a different monetary-cum-exchange-rate policy will have an enduring 
impact. 
   There are similar counterarguments to the view that a country like Italy that 
reintroduced the lira in order to pursue a monetary-cum-exchange-rate policy that stepped 
down the value of the debt would necessarily be penalized with lower credit ratings and 
higher debt-servicing costs.  Sovereign debt is a contingent claim; when debt is rendered 
unsustainable by shocks not of the government’s own making and the source of those 
shocks can be verified independently, there are theoretical arguments for why investors   10
will see a write-down as excusable.
15 Even when the country’s debt problem is of its own 
making, credible institutional and policy reforms – strict legal or constitutional limits on 
future budget deficits, stronger independence to insulate the central bank from pressure to 
help finance future debts – may reassure the markets that past losses will not recur.  The 
fact that the debt burden has been lightened similarly makes it look less likely that prior 
problems will be repeated.  There is ample evidence from history that governments that 
default, either explicitly by restructuring or implicitly by inflating, are able to regain 
market access following appropriate institutional and policy reforms.  The mixed findings 
of studies seeking to identify a reputational penalty in the form of higher interest rates are 
consistent with the view that this penalty can be avoided by countries that follow up with 
institutional and policy reforms reassuring investors that the experience will not be 
repeated.  The implication is that the cost in terms of reputation may not be a prohibitive 
barrier to exit. 
  How applicable is this scenario to countries like Italy?  It is hard to argue that 
Italy’s heavy debt burden is due to factors not of its own making.  Italy does not have a 
reassuring history of guarding the central bank’s independence or of adopting budgetary 
procedures and institutions that limit free-rider and common-pool problems.  Whether 
exiting the euro area and reintroducing the lira would therefore result in credit-rating 
downgrades and increases in spreads sufficient to deter any such decision is an empirical 
question.
16 
  The other economic barrier to exit cited in this connection is that a country that 
abandoned the euro and reintroduced its national currency might be denied the privileges 
                                                 
15 See e.g. Grossman and van Huyck (1988). 
16 More on which below.   11
of the single market.  A country that reintroduced its national currency at levels that 
stepped down its labor costs by 20 per cent might be required to pay a 20 per cent 
compensatory duty when exporting to other members of the EU, reflecting concerns that 
it was unfairly manipulating its currency and solving its economic problems at the 
expense of its neighbors.  Whatever the compensatory tariff, collecting it would require 
the reestablishment of customs posts and border controls, adding to transactions costs.  
Other states might seek to tax foreign investment outflows on the grounds that the 
defector was using an unfair monetary-cum-exchange-rate policy to attract FDI.  In this 
climate of ill will and recrimination, they might seek to limit the freedom of movement of 
its citizens. 
  But it is not clear that other member states could or would respond in this way.  
Sweden, Denmark, the United Kingdom and all but one of the new member states have 
their own national currencies, yet they are not denied the privileges of the single market.  
If Germany, Italy or Portugal decided to join their ranks, it is not clear that it could be 
treated any differently under European law.  To be sure, the new members states are 
obliged to keep their currencies within the plus-or-minus 15 per cent bands against the 
euro specified by the ERM-II, which limits the scope for currency manipulation, but the 
UK and Sweden do not participate in the ERM.  It can be objected that the UK and 
Sweden anchor their monetary policies by inflation targeting, which frees them of 
accusations that they are manipulating their currencies relative to the euro.  But a country 
like Germany that left the euro area out of dissatisfaction with the ECB’s inflationary bias 
would presumably do likewise.
17  Even a country abandoning the euro because it saw a 
need to step up the price level as a way of addressing debt and unemployment problems 
                                                 
17 Or, who knows, adopt a two-pillar strategy targeting inflation and a monetary aggregate.   12
might then adopt inflation targeting as a way of avoiding reputational damage.  In turn 
this could insulate it from accusations that it was continuing to manipulate its currency.  
Countries can remain EU member states in good standing and enjoy all the privileges 
associated with that status without adopting the euro.  To be sure, most of the new 
members have not adopted the euro because they do not yet meet the preconditions laid 
down by the Maastricht Treaty, where there is a presumption that this status is purely 
transitional.  The UK, for its part, negotiated a derogation permitting it to remain outside 
the ERM and to retain sterling indefinitely as a condition for agreeing to the Maastricht 
Treaty.   An Italy or Portugal that abandoned the euro would enjoy no such derogation.  
Would it then have to joint the ERM-II?  But Sweden, alluding to the British precedent, 
announced unilaterally that it would not enter the ERM or follow a fixed schedule for 
adopting the euro.  Is it clear that a Sweden that never entered the euro area should be 
treated differently, in terms of its access to the single market, than an Italy that left it? 
 
4.  Political Barriers to Exit 
  More generally, a country that abandoned the euro and reintroduced its national 
currency because of problems of inadequate international competitiveness, high 
unemployment and slow growth might suffer political costs by being relegated to second-
class status in negotiations over other issues.  One interpretation of the process of 
monetary integration that culminated in the advent of the euro is that monetary 
integration is a stepping stone to political integration, which is the ultimate goal of the 
architects of the European Union.  As the point was once put by Jacques Delors, 
“Obsession about budgetary constraints means that the people forget too often about the   13
political objectives of European construction.  The argument in favor of the single 
currency should be based on the desire to live together in peace.”
18  Like the EU’s blue 
flag with 12 yellow stars, the single currency is a visible symbol which fosters a sense of 
Europeanness among the continent’s residents.  As suggested by the theory of 
neofunctionalist spillovers (Haas 1958), the existence of the euro and the European 
Central Bank generates pressure for a more powerful European Parliament to hold the 
ECB democratically accountable for its actions.
19  A country that unilaterally abandons 
the euro, something for which there is no provision in the Treaty of European Union, 
would deal a setback to these larger political ambitions.  It would signal that it did not 
attach high value to the larger process of political integration.   
On both grounds such a country would be unlikely to be regarded as a respected 
interlocutor in discussions of how to push the process forward.  An Italy that abandoned 
the euro would have a diminished role in discussions of how to strengthen the powers of 
the European Parliament.  It would have less sway in discussions of how to revise and 
ratify the European constitution.  Other member states would be less likely to grant it a 
seat at the table in discussions of whether to formulate a common foreign policy or to 
create a European army.  For better or worse, the common European position on such 
issues has grown out of discussions among a core of countries centered on France and 
Germany that first develop a common position and then sell it to the other members.  For 
a country like Italy that has participated in this larger process of European integration 
from the foundation of the European Economic Community half a century ago, precisely 
                                                 
18 Cited in Prior-Wandesforde (2005), p.23. 
19 See Section 5 below.   14
as a way of elevating itself to the status of a “first-tier” European country, these political 
costs would be substantial.  In turn this constitutes a major barrier to exit. 
  What about Germany?  If Germany abandoned the euro out of dissatisfaction with 
excessively inflationary ECB policies, this would significantly diminish the prospects for 
political integration.  Germany would be indicating that it regarded the experiment with a 
supra-national institution with real powers, in this case the power to make monetary 
policy, as a failure.  The idea that Germany would then cede to other supra-national 
institutions at the EU level the power to make its security policy, its foreign policy or its 
fiscal policy, these being three of the key prerogatives of a sovereign state, would become 
less plausible.  Germany has always been a strong proponent of the larger European 
project.  Reflecting memories of World War II, it continues to feel limits on its ability to 
formulate an assertive foreign policy, maintain a standing army, and deploy troops 
abroad; at a basic level its interest in political integration is to regain a foreign policy 
voice in the context of an EU foreign policy.  And without German support, European 
political integration is unlikely to display the same momentum. 
  Given this, Germany will presumably attempt to fix the problems it perceives 
with the ECB in order to salvage its vision of political integration rather than concluding 
that further integration is infeasible and abandoning the euro – or at least that it will 
invest more in seeking to fix perceived problems than another member state with a 
weaker commitment to the larger European process.  It will choose voice and loyalty over 
exit, complaining publicly about the inflationary stance of ECB policy and lobbying to 
change it, precisely in order to demonstrate that supra-national European institutions can 
work and that its integrationist vision is still viable.  This is not to deny that there could   15
come a point where the German government and its constituents conclude that voice and 
loyalty have failed.  But this argument does suggest that Germany may be prepared to 
suffer with a monetary policy not to its liking, and that it will work to change that policy 
rather than abandoning the euro, for longer than other member states less committed to 
the larger process. 
  Not everyone will agree that a monetary union process that adds to momentum for 
political integration is desirable on these grounds.  Some would argue that the EU should 
concentrate on economic integration while shunning aspirations of political integration.  
For them, if a failure of monetary union means a failure of political union, then the latter 
is not a cost.
20  But for influential political elites, political integration remains a valued 
goal.  For them, exits from the euro area that set back its progress would be a significant 
cost. 
 
5.  Technical and Legal Barriers to Exit 
  A final set of barriers to exit are the technical and legal obstacles to reintroducing 
the national currency.  Take the case where a country suffering from inadequate 
competitiveness and high unemployment reintroduces its national currency in order to 
depreciate it against the euro.  It would be straightforward for it to pass a law stating that 
the state and other employers will henceforth pay workers and pensioners in, say, lira.  
With wages and other incomes redenominated into the national currency, it would 
become politically necessary to redenominate the mortgages and credit-card debts of 
residents into the national currency as well; otherwise currency depreciation would have 
                                                 
20 This is not to say that the opponents of political union necessarily see the failure of monetary union as 
desirable, since the latter may have other benefits, including the impetus it provides to economic integration.   16
adverse balance-sheet effects for households, leading to financial distress and 
bankruptcies.  But with mortgages and other bank assets redenominated, bank deposits 
and other bank balance sheet items would have to be redenominated as well in order to 
avoid destabilizing the financial sector.  With government revenues redenominated into 
the national currency, not just public-sector wages and pensions but also other 
government liabilities, notably the public debt, would have to be redenominated to 
prevent balance-sheet effects from damaging the government’s financial position.   
  The idea that redenomination has to be comprehensive to limit financial distress is 
a lesson of Argentina’s exit from convertibility in 2001.
21  It is also an implication of the 
literature on dollarization, where it is argued that partial dollarization creates scope for 
destabilizing balance-sheet effects.  Better to be either fully dollarized (or euroized in the 
present example) or to de-dollarize (or de-euroize) by redenominating claims in the 
national currency.
22 
  Technically, nothing prevents the legislature from passing a law requiring banks, 
firms, households and governments to redenominate their contracts in this manner.  But 
in a democracy this decision will require discussion.  And for it to be executed smoothly, 
it will have to be accompanied by planning.  Computers will have to be reprogrammed.  
Vending machines will have to be modified.  Payment machines will have to be serviced 
to prevent motorists from being trapped in subterranean parking garages.  Notes and 
                                                 
21 Note that across-the-board redenomination, while insulating domestic banks from destabilizing balance 
sheet effects, might create problems for foreign banks, which saw their euro-denominated investments in, 
say, Italian government bonds now redenominated into lira and then saw this currency depreciate against 
the euro.  This is another reason why other euro area countries would not welcome exit by an incumbent 
seeking to restore competitiveness by reintroducing and depreciating its national currency. 
22 See e.g. Levy Yeyati (2005, 2006).   17
coins will have to be positioned around the country.  One need only recall the planning 
that preceded the introduction of the physical euro in 2002. 
  The difference between the transition to the euro and the transition back to 
national currencies is that in the first instance there was little reason to expect subsequent 
changes in exchange rates and thus little incentive for currency speculation, while in the 
second case such changes would be viewed as virtually inevitable.  In 1998 the founding 
members of the euro area agreed to lock their exchange rates at the then-prevailing levels 
as of the beginning of 1999.  This precommitment effectively ruled out efforts to depress 
national currencies designed to steal a competitive advantage prior to the locking of 
parities in 1999.  In contrast, if a participating member state now decided to leave the 
euro area, no such precommitment would be possible.  Pressure from other member states 
would be ineffective, by definition.  And the very motivation for leaving would 
presumably be to change the parity. 
Market participants would be well aware of this fact.  Households and firms 
anticipating that domestic deposits would be redenominated into lira, which would then 
lose value against the euro, would shift their deposits to other euro-area banks.  In the 
worst case a system-wide bank run could follow.  Investors anticipating that their claims 
on the Italian government would be redenominated into lira would presumably shift into 
claims on other euro-area governments, leading to a bond-market crisis.  If the 
precipitating factor was parliamentary debate over abandoning the lira, it would be 
unlikely that the ECB would provide extensive lender-of-last-resort support.  And if the 
government was already in a tenuous fiscal position, it would not be able to borrow to 
bail out the banks and buy back its debt.  Presumably the government would respond with   18
a “corralito,” Argentine style, limiting bank withdrawals.  It would suspend the operation 
of the bond market, although this might be of limited effectiveness insofar as the same 
bonds and derivative instruments based on them are also traded on other national markets. 
When the ruble zone broke up in the 1990s and new national currencies were 
introduced, the successor states of the former Soviet Union were able to limit the 
destabilizing financial consequences because their banking and financial systems were 
not well articulated, so that limits on deposit withdrawals and other forms of arbitrage 
were relatively effective.  They could limit the substitution of foreign for domestic assets 
by imposing or simply retaining exchange controls, an option that is not available to EU 
members with commitments to the single market.  They could seal their borders to 
provide time to stamp old currencies or swap old currencies for new ones.  Firms did not 
have computerized financial accounts and inventory-management systems.  Europe today 
is a more complicated place.  All this means that the technical obstacles to exit may be 
greater than in the past.  While these technical obstacles may be surmountable, they pose 
greater challenges than in earlier instances where monetary unions broke up. 
And even if there is agreement that the transition would be smoothed by 
redenominating all Italian debt contracts into lira, there is the question of what exactly 
constitutes an Italian debt contract.  Not all such contracts are between Italian debtors and 
Italian creditors, are issued in Italy, and specify Italian courts for adjudicating disputes.  
Italian companies issue bonds abroad and borrow from foreign banks.  Foreign 
multinationals sell bonds in Italy.  Foreigners hold the bonds of Italian governments.  A 
further complication is that contracts are not simply being redenominated from one 
Italian currency to another; rather, they are being redenominated from a European   19
currency to an Italian currency.  Foreign courts might therefore take EU law as the law of 
the currency issuer (Italy) and invalidate the redenomination of certain contracts. 
 Mann (1960) argues when a case involves two competing currencies the courts 
should apply the law specified in the contract.  For instruments like Italian government 
bonds issued domestically, this is Italian law.  But foreign laws govern a variety of other 
Italian financial instruments, such as corporate bonds issued abroad.  And in some cases 
no explicit choice of law is specified in the contract.  This is the case, for example, of 
loans by German banks to Italian corporations or purchases of parts in Germany by 
Italian manufacturing firms.  Italian courts would presumably rule in favor of the 
redenomination of all loans to Italian borrowers, including those from German banks, but 
German courts might rule against redenomination.  And there are few precedents to guide 
the courts’ decision in such circumstances.
23  This opens the door to litigation and to an 
extended period of uncertainty.   
Argentina’s dealings with its creditors suggest that the government of a country 
altering its currency arrangements is in a relatively strong position.  While that case also 
gave rise to litigation in a variety of venues, it did not force the re-dollarization of 
previously pesified contracts or force other compensation to aggrieved creditors.  But 
cases involving suits against Italian debtors in the courts of other European countries and 
in the European Court of Justice could be messier.  And the Italian government would be 
loath to disregard their judgments insofar as it attached value to the country’s other links 
with the European Union. 
                                                 
23 Technically, the country in which delivery is physically taken (where the transaction is physically 
completed) should be the one whose law governs international contracts.  In the present instance, this 
would be German law if the Italian company’s truck drives to Stuttgart to pick up parts at the German 
factory but Italy if the German company’s truck is used to transport the parts to the Italian assembly plant.   20
     
6.  Evidence 
Since 2002, Eurobarometer has conducted annual surveys of public opinion 
regarding the euro in the participating member states.  Here I analyze answers to the 
question: “In your opinion, for [COUNTRY], is the adoption of the euro advantageous 
overall and will it strengthen us for the future, or rather the opposite, disadvantageous 
overall and will it weaken us?”  Figure 1 shows the pattern of responses from the most 
recent survey at the time of writing.  Evidently, the euro is least popular, as measured 
here, in low-income euro-area member states (Greece, Portugal) and slowing growing 
economies (Italy and again Portugal), but also in the Netherlands (where concerns are 
disproportionately over inflation – see Figure 2). 
Table 1 shows regressions of the share of the population, by country and year, that 
views the euro as disadvantageous.  The dependent variable, a logit transformation of this 
share, is regressed on inflation and growth in the current year.
24  The results are 
consistent with the notion that higher inflation raises dissatisfaction with the euro, while 
higher growth reduces dissatisfaction.  In the basic regression on pooled data, in column 
1, the growth term is statistically significant at conventional levels, while the inflation 
term is not quite significant.  When year effects are added in column 2, the coefficients 
on both the inflation and growth terms differ significantly from zero at standard 
confidence levels.  When we estimate the same equation with random country effects in 
column 3, it is the inflation term but not the growth term that is statistically significant.  
                                                 
24 One can imagine more sophisticated specifications, but the limited amount of data available do not really 
permit their estimation.   21
Thus, while there are not enough data to obtain precise point estimates, there are 
consistent indications that slow growth and high inflation could fan dissatisfaction with 
membership in the euro area. 
The second empirical exercise has in fact been undertaken recently by Hallerberg 
and Wolff (2006), although they do not draw out the implications for exit from the euro 
area.    They test whether both membership in the monetary union and fiscal reforms that 
reduce deficit bias have a negative impact on sovereign borrowing costs.  Thus, they 
speak at least obliquely to the hypothesis that a country could minimize any adverse 
impact on debt-servicing costs of abandoning the euro by strengthening its fiscal 
institutions.  They estimate panel regressions with country fixed effects for ten EU 
member states, where the dependent variable is the yield on ten year government bond 
rates relative to the corresponding German yield and the period covered is 1993-2005.  
This spread is regressed on the difference in the budget deficit between country i and 
Germany, and the difference in the public debt/GDP ratio between country i and 
Germany.  Control variables include a measure of market liquidity and a measure of 
global risk aversion.  The key explanatory variables are then a dummy variable for 
membership in the euro area and the strength of fiscal institutions, which are entered by 
themselves and interacted with the deficit measure.
25 
The authors follow von Hagen (1992) in arguing that deficit bias reflects a 
common pool problem: that special interests benefiting from additional public spending 
fail to internalize the implications for the deficit and therefore for the government’s 
borrowing costs.  They argue that this bias can be minimized by assigning authority over 
the budget to a single individual, the finance minister, who will have a greater tendency 
                                                 
25 In addition, the EMU variable is interacted with the measure of market liquidity and with the debt ratio.   22
to internalize such effects.  They operationalize this idea by constructing an index 
measuring the ability of the finance minister to affect the budget.  They also consider a 
survey-based measure of the structure of the budget process and a synthetic measure that 
relies not on delegation but on fiscal targets for countries where the ideological distance 
between coalition partners is large and therefore delegation is unlikely to be effective.
26  
Results are similar for the alternative measures, so I discuss the most straightforward 
ones, those for delegation of authority to the finance minister, here. 
Higher debts and deficits increase spreads, although the effects are small.  The 
effect of EMU is also evident: an increase in the deficit by 1 per cent of GDP raises the 
spread by 4 basis points for a non-euro-area country but only by 1.5 per cent for a euro-
area member.  An increase in the finance minister’s powers from Portuguese to Austrian 
levels reduces the spread by 2 to 4 basis points; it also reduces the impact of an increase 
in the deficit by one per cent of GDP by 2 basis points.  These results are consistent with 
the hypothesis that EMU and strengthened budgetary procedures are alternative ways of 
strengthening fiscal discipline.
27  They suggest that countries exiting the monetary union 
can avoid higher interest costs if they put in place efficient budgetary procedures that 
mitigate common-pool problems.  At the same time, the small size of the effects is 
curious.  Just 4 ½ additional basis points for a euro area country whose deficit grows 
from zero to 3 per cent of GDP makes one wonder whether these estimates are picking up 
the full effect or if something else is going on. 
                                                 
26 In addition they consider a measure of the degree of the legislature or parliament over the budget 
(Lienert’s (2005) parliamentary index).  However, it is possible to raise questions about the relevance of 
this particular measure to the issues at hand.  Hence I do not consider it further in what follows. 
27 The assumption underlying this interpretation is that the smaller impact of deficits on spreads in euro 
area countries reflect the disciplining effect of the monetary union – that deficits will not persist, or that 
larger deficit now will be followed by smaller deficits later – rather than myopia on the part of governments 
or that the latter will receive a debt bailout from their partners in the event of fiscal difficulties.   23
I further investigated the robustness of these results by analyzing the impact of 
EMU and fiscal institutions on sovereign credit ratings.  This involved analyzing their 
impact on three credit-rating measures: Fitch’s, Standard and Poor’s, and an average of 
the two rating agencies.  In the interest of space, here I report the results using the 
average of the two ratings as the dependent variable.
28  The country sample and period 
are essentially the same as in the Hallerberg and Wolff study, since the analysis is 
constrained by the availability of their indices of fiscal measures.  One difference here is 
the use of quarterly data: the fiscal measures are available at a quarterly frequency, and 
the credit ratings can be sampled at the end of each quarter.  Another difference is that I 
look at the absolute level of credit ratings, not ratings (or spreads) relative to Germany 
(and not the strength of fiscal institutions relative to Germany).
29 
I start with a simple panel regression of the credit rating(s) on the measure of 
fiscal institutions (in column 1 of each table).  Year fixed effects are then added (column 
2), and if these are jointly significant they are then included in the remaining regressions.  
Column 3 adds country effects (using the Hausman test to choose between fixed and 
random effects).  Column 4 adds the entire vector of macroeconomic and financial 
variables.  The empirical specification follows Christensen and Solomonsen (2007), who 
estimate empirical models of credit ratings; the main difference here is the addition of 
interaction effects for euro area countries, plus the use of total debt rather than public 
debt (following Hallerberg and Wolff).  Finally, I incorporate improvements in the 
measures of fiscal arrangements developed by the authors since the appearance of their 
                                                 
28 The additional results for Fitch and S&P separately are available on request.  The Fitch and S&P letter 
scores are both converted to a numerical score ranging from 1 to 21. 
29 As a result, I have an additional set of country observations for Germany itself.   24
earlier working paper.
30  Specifically, I employ three measures of fiscal arrangements: 
“Strong Finance Minister” (a measure of the power of the finance minister during budget 
negotiations in the cabinet and with parliament), and “Index S2” (the authors’ synthetic 
measure that relies not on delegation to a strong finance minister but on fiscal targets for 
countries where the ideological distance between coalition partners is large), “Fiscgov” 
(the authors’ survey-based measure of the degree of centralization of the budgetary 
process).  All three measures are scaled so as to vary from zero to one, with larger values 
indicating arrangements better suited for resolving common pool problems. 
The results, in Tables 2 through 4, are broadly consistent with those using spreads 
as the dependent variable, although there are some anomalies.
31  All three measures of the 
centralization of fiscal policy making are positively associated with the rating agencies’ 
measures of credit quality.  This remains the case, except for Index S2, when a wide 
range of controls are included in the estimating equation.  Macroeconomic and financial 
conditions generally affect ratings in the expected direction, although their effects are not 
always significant at conventional confidence levels.  Inflation unemployment, large 
current account deficits, and high debts lower ratings.  So far, so good. 
Evidence on whether adopting the euro attenuates the impact of macroeconomic 
and financial imbalances on credit ratings is mixed.  Consistent with the hypothesis, the 
negative effects of inflation and unemployment on credit ratings are attenuated by 
participation in the monetary union.  Countries with large current account deficits suffer 
less in terms of credit rating if they are members of the monetary union.  The one 
                                                 
30 And kindly made available by Mark Hallerberg. 
31 I adopt the same variable names as Hallerberg and Wolff for ease of comparison, except that I refer to the 
squared deviation of real GDP per capita from trend as “Trend Deviation” (or simply “Deviation”) as 
opposed to “Sustainability” to avoid confusion with debt sustainability.   25
uncomfortable result is that the interaction of the EMU dummy with the debt ratio 
(general government consolidated gross debt as a percentage of GDP) is negative, not 
positive as anticipated under the maintained hypothesis.  This coefficient is zero in the 
final column, where the lagged dependent variable is included (as seems to be preferred 
by the data), which makes the result somewhat less perplexing.  Sensitivity analysis – 
dropping countries one by one – reveals that these anomalous results are driven by 
Belgium.  Without the observations for this one country, one obtains a negative and 
significant coefficient on the debt/GDP ratio and a smaller positive and significant 
coefficient on the debt/GDP ratio interacted with EMU.  This is not entirely surprising in 
that Belgium has long had a relatively high credit rating despite its very high government 
debt, for reasons that are not entirely clear. 
One interpretation of these results is that any increase in debt-servicing costs 
experienced by a country like Portugal abandoning the euro can be neutralized by 
reforming fiscal institutions to delegate more authority to the prime minister, addressing 
concerns over the common-pool problem and reassuring investors that exit will not result 
in a loss of fiscal discipline.  The financial disincentive may not, therefore, be an 
insurmountable obstacle to abandoning the euro.   
One reason for questioning these results is that the impact of debts and deficits – 
euro adoption and fiscal institutions notwithstanding – are suspiciously small in these 
regressions, as in the earlier work of Hallerberg and Wolff on interest rate spreads.
32  One 
worries that, for whatever reason, these results are not picking up the entire effect of 
                                                 
32 Thus, an increase in the debt ratio from 50 to 100 per cent of GDP is expected to lower a country’s credit 
rating by just one notch, from say A to A-.  This small effect is a widely commented upon phenomenon 
(see e.g. Buiter and Sibert 2005), although here it applies not just to euro area but also non-euro area 
countries.   26
fiscal conditions, current and prospective, on credit ratings.  But the fact that the rating 
agencies do not dramatically differentiate between fiscally messy Belgium and Italy and 
fiscally responsible Finland and Ireland is widely commented upon – just as it is noted 
that markets differentiate between them relatively little in terms of interest rate spreads.  
If there is an anomaly, in other words, it would appear to be in the behavior of investors 
and rating agencies rather than in the econometrics.   
In addition, one worries that ratings fail to reflect differences in current fiscal 
conditions among euro area countries not because the euro represents a commitment to 
get one’s fiscal house together in the not too distant future but rather because fiscally 
profligate governments can expect a debt bailout from their euro area partners.  At the 
same time, the prospects for a bailout can be questioned.  And even if the mechanism 
making for rosier future prospects is a bailout rather than fiscal reform, this does not 
change the argument that a potential benefit of euro area membership is an easier fiscal 
ride.  One worries that in a more turbulent environment (out of sample) the results might 
differ – although it is not entirely clear why the Lucas Critique would apply in this 
context.  Finally, to the extent that fiscal rules are endogenous (to the extent that they 
reflect the same political pressures that lead to large observed deficits), it may be naïve to 
think that a country abandoning the euro because of chronic deficit problems will then be 
able to turn around and strengthen its policy-making institutions.  That said, it is 
interesting to observe that Italy succeeded in significantly strengthening the ability of the 
finance minister to affect the budget following the 1992 crisis that ejected it from the   27
Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European Monetary System and presumably weakened 





7.  Reforms to Avert a Breakup 
  If one wishes to minimize the likelihood of breakup, then what kind of reforms 
are needed?  Here there is no magic potion, only the standard measures pointed to by the 
literatures on optimum currency areas and the democratic accountability of economic 
policy makers.
34 
  Measures to further enhance labor mobility within the euro area are a first set of 
reforms pointed to by OCA theory.
35  Regulations to ensure that French ski resorts extend 
equality of treatment to instructors trained in other European countries – and, more 
generally, removing residual barriers to the mutual recognition of technical credentials, 
the portability of pensions, and the receipt of social services in the new labor market – 
will relieve the pressure that countries with depressed labor markets otherwise feel to do 
something, anything, including reintroducing the national currency, to address their 
unemployment problem.  Concretely, the EU has made some progress in the requisite 
                                                 
33 The same was true of, inter alia, Spain and Finland according to the indices of Hallerberg and Wolff 
(2006). 
34 An earlier attempt to ask these same questions is Cohen (2000). 
35 Supplemented by measures to enhance the flexibility of real and nominal wages.  ECB (2007) argues that 
real wages remain less flexible in the euro area than in the United States and that the degree of wage 
bargaining centralization and percentage of employees organized in trade unions – factors likely to 
condition the extent of such flexibility – have remained largely unchanged.  At the same time, there has 
been a reduction of wage minima affecting young people and the implementation of sub-minimum wage 
regulations for youths in some euro area countries, which some would argue has enhanced wage flexibility 
in certain segments of the labor market.  Such arguments would suggest that further reforms along similar 
lines would make it easier for countries suffering shocks requiring downward wage adjustment to cope with 
the single currency.  This would appear to be the ECB’s own view (see the same reference).   28
direction, making qualifications more transparent and transferable by creating a standard 
portfolio of documents (“the Europass”), removing many remaining administrative and 
legal barriers to mobility, coordinating cross-border social security provisions through the 
introduction of a European health insurance card, and making occupational pension rights 
more portable.   
Note however some uncomfortable implications of this advice.  Facilitating labor 
mobility within the monetary union implies reinforcing barriers to immigration, legal and 
illegal, from outside the union.  Australia allows citizens of New Zealand to work freely 
in its country, and vice versa, but only New Zealand permits the relatively free 
immigration of citizens of Fiji.
36  Customs and immigration officials in Australia spend 
much of their time repatriating illegal Fijian immigrants entering through New Zealand, 
straining the arrangements designed to ensure integration of the two national labor 
markets.  In the European context, limiting the strains on the labor markets of the 
countries on the receiving end of the labor flow and hence the political fallout may 
require limiting immigration from outside the union.  Among other things this may mean 
limiting labor mobility from North Africa and the Middle East, regions where earnings 
differentials vis-à-vis the EU are large and the efficiency effects of freer labor mobility 
would be especially pronounced.
37  Harsh treatment of undocumented immigrants from 
these countries may also create strains with their governments, which would not be 
helpful for an EU that is trying to encourage democratic values and market-oriented 
economic development in what is sometimes referred to as “Wider Europe.” 
                                                 
36 For whose foreign policy it has traditionally borne responsibility. 
37 For arguments to this effect see Rodrik (2002) and Bhagwati (2003).   29
One can even imagine differential treatment of workers from EU member states 
that have and have not adopted the euro.  Allowing, indeed encouraging, workers to 
relocate freely within the monetary union would become more uncomfortable politically 
if workers from member states from outside the euro area were also permitted to freely 
migrate to relatively prosperous euro area member states.  One can imagine political 
pressure to situate the immigration ring-fence at the borders of the euro area, not at the 
borders of the EU itself.  In the short run this would create problems for the Schengen 
Agreement, which has been implemented by Denmark and Sweden as well as most euro 
area member states.
38  In the longer run it is likely to create strains between EU members 
inside and outside the fence and disrupt the operation of the single market.  The idea that 
euro area member states would only take measures to further enhance labor mobility 
among themselves if there was also a credible barrier against immigration from tiny, 
prosperous Denmark is not especially compelling, but one can imagine such concerns 
becoming serious if and when, say, Turkey is admitted to the EU. 
Measures to enhance the countercyclical use of fiscal policy are the other reforms 
pointed to by the literature on optimum currency areas.  European countries are 
uncomfortable with their loss of monetary autonomy because, having tied the monetary 
hand behind their backs, they have little scope for using fiscal policy countercyclically.  
Inherited debt ratios are high, which means that increasing deficit spending in slowdowns 
threatens rating downgrades and increases in borrowing costs.  The Stability and Growth 
Pact, whatever the practice, in principle limits the scope for discretionary fiscal policy 
and even automatic stabilizers in countries close to or exceeding its 3 per cent of GDP 
threshold for excessive deficits.  To be sure, for countries like Portugal, where the 
                                                 
38 And by Norway and Iceland.   30
problem is excessive labor costs and inadequate competitiveness, expansionary fiscal 
policy to boost aggregate demand is beside the point; the imperative is to cut labor costs, 
and using fiscal policy might only slow the inevitable adjustment while threatening debt 
sustainability.  Still, one can imagine a variety of other countries suffering negative 
aggregate demand shocks that can be offset by temporary increases in budget deficits that 
would benefit from greater freedom to use fiscal policy in countercyclical fashion. 
For them, reforms of the Stability Pact that encourage governments to run budgets 
close to balance or even in surplus in good times, so that they can allow deficits to widen 
in bad times, would make life with the euro more comfortable.
39  My own view is that 
reform of the Stability Pact should encourage changes in fiscal institutions and 
procedures that work to solve common-pool and free-rider problems and thereby contain 
deficit bias in good times.
40  The alternative where the European Commission and 
Council agree to fines and sanctions against countries whose deficits are deemed 
excessive assumes a level of political solidarity – a Europe in which different 
                                                 
39 Ti be clear, I am not arguing that the 3 per cent ceiling is too low, but rather that it leaves inadequate 
room for countercyclical policy because deficits are excessive in good times.  I assume that the Stability 
Pact will be analyzed in another paper for this conference.  In any case there are too many alternative 
reform proposals for these to be usefully surveyed here.  See Fischer, Jonung and Larch (2007) for a survey 
of alternatives. 
40 On fiscal decentralization as a source of common pool problems, see Rattso (2003) and Eichengreen 
(2003).  My own scheme for reform is as follows.  The rationale for the Pact is that deficits today may 
imply deficits tomorrow, and that chronic deficits will force the ECB to provide an inflationary debt bailout.  
But not all deficits are equally persistent.  Chronic deficits are a danger only where countries fail to reform 
their fiscal institutions.  Countries with large unfunded pension liabilities, like Greece and Spain, will 
almost certainly have deficits down the road.  Where workers are allowed to draw unemployment and 
disability benefits indefinitely, deficits today signal deficits tomorrow.  Countries that have not completed 
privatizing public enterprise, like France, are similarly more likely to find future fiscal skeletons in the 
closet.  Where revenue-sharing systems that allow states and municipalities to spend today and be bailed 
out tomorrow, central governments will almost certainly suffer chronic deficits.  Thus, the Pact should 
focus not on fiscal numbers, which are arbitrary and easily cooked, but on fiscal institutions.  The Council 
of Ministers could agree on an index of institutional reform with, say, a point each for privatization, 
pension reform, unemployment insurance reform, and revenue sharing reform.  It should then authorize the 
Commission to grade countries accordingly.  Those receiving four points would be exempt from the 
Stability Pact’s guidelines, since there is no reason to expect that they will be prone to chronic deficits.  The 
others, in contrast, would still be subject to warnings, sanctions, and fines.   31
nationalities view themselves as members of a common polity, such that a majority of 
members can impose fines and sanctions against a renegade minority – that does not exist 
and is unlikely to exist for the foreseeable future.  In the absence of deeper political 
integration, in other words, a Stability Pact with anything resembling the current structure 
is unlikely to be enforceable.
41 
The same conclusion applies to proposals to strengthen the operation of the 
monetary union by supplementing it with a European system of fiscal federalism.  A 
system of temporary transfers among member states or an expanded EU budget where 
contributions and expenditures are keyed to a member state’s relative economic situation 
could provide an alternative to a national monetary policy as a buffer during periods of 
cyclical divergence.
42  Economic activity would be more stable, since intra-country 
transfers would render demand more stable.  But making such transfers effective would 
require significant expansion of the EU budget, especially insofar as the majority of that 
budget is tied up in agricultural subsidies and ongoing transfers to relatively low-income 
member states.  And, again, significantly increasing the share of tax revenues that 
member states pay to the EU and whose disposition is then decided by the member states 
as a group would require a level of political solidarity that does not exist.   
Another way of thinking about this is that fiscal federalism is an insurance pool 
through which members of the monetary union that are temporarily better off assist their 
                                                 
41 This argument has a long lineage; see inter alia Kindleberger (1973) and Eichengreen (1997).  As 
DeGrauwe (2006) puts it, while the European Commission decides when a country’s deficit is excessive 
and its government must therefore cut spending and raise taxes, it is the national government that must 
implement those tax increases and spending cuts and will be rewarded or punished for doing so by its 
constituents.  In contrast, the Commission cannot be replaced except in the event of dereliction of duty.  In 
effect the Commission – and therefore the Stability and Growth Pact – lacks democratic legitimacy.  It will 
continue to lack such legitimacy until European political integration proceeds further and results in, inter 
alia, direct election of the Commission. 
42 Early influential statements of this view were Inman and Rubinfeld (1992) and Sala-i-Martin and Sachs 
(1992).   32
brethren who are temporarily worse off – that participants require a system of collective 
self-help if they are going to willingly expose themselves to the vicissitudes of monetary 
union.  Rodrik (1996) has made an argument like this to explain why more open 
economies have larger governments – that their citizens are willing to expose themselves 
to the vicissitudes and uncertainties of trade openness only if they can count on help from 
their stronger neighbors in the event of a temporary worsening of their economic 
situation due to international competition.  The analogy here is that countries suffering 
temporary unexpected economic costs as a consequence of their participation in the 
monetary union would accept the latter only if they can expect temporarily transfers from 
their neighbors to buffer the effects.  The difference is that Rodrik’s argument applies to 
citizens of the same country, where the present argument concerns transfers between 
sovereign states.  One suspects that the citizens of different countries will be less 
enthusiastic about giving money to one another; lacking a common national identity, they 
lack the requisite political solidarity, absent significant steps toward political integration 
at the European level.
43   
A similar implication flows from the observation that the risk of a break-up could 
be reduced by enhancing the democratic accountability of the ECB.  The modern 
literature on monetary policy distinguishes a central bank’s operational independence and 
democratic accountability.  A central bank should have the independence to select and 
implement its tactics independent of political pressures, but in choosing the objectives at 
which those tactics are directed it should be answerable to the polity.  National central 
banks ultimately answer to national legislatures, which have the power to alter their 
                                                 
43 In addition, Rodrik’s premise and central result have been questioned by Alesina and Wacziarg (1998), 
who argue that the actual association is between government spending and country size, with small 
countries both spending more on public consumption and being more open to trade.   33
statutes in the event that those responsible for the formulation of monetary policy are 
perceived as pursuing objectives inconsistent with their mandate – where the latter is 
decided by the polity as a whole.
44   
But in Europe there is no euro-area or EU government that can act as an effective 
counterweight to the ECB.
45  The powers of the European Parliament are limited relative 
to those of national parliaments and legislatures.  The Parliament holds hearings at which 
the president of the ECB delivers a statement and answers questions but cannot threaten 
to replace the president in the event of disagreement over objectives.  The mandate of the 
ECB is a matter of international treaty, signed by the governments of the member states, 
and cannot be altered by the Parliament.  Altering it requires the unanimous consent of 
the member states, which would be a formidable obstacle in practice.
46  This means that 
the ECB is less democratically accountable than the typical national central bank.  In turn 
this leaves less cope for the European polity to influence its objectives.  In the event of 
serious disagreement, political groups that object to how the central bank chooses to 
                                                 
44 Some authors, e.g. Alesina and Tabellini (2006a,b), argue that the need for democratic accountability of 
independent agencies like the ECB can be overstated.  They argue that EU member states have shown 
themselves prepared to accept limited democratic accountability for such institutions as the price for policy 
efficiency, pointing not just to the ECB but also the case of the European Commission.  My own view is 
that the effort to draft a European constitution (including the Nice Summit that preceded the constitutional 
convention and the Brussels Summit that followed it) point to a deep and abiding desire in Europe for the 
adequate democratic accountability of such institutions. 
45 Accountability can be defined and provided in different ways; see, in the context of the ECB, Bini-
Smaghi (1998), Buiter (1999), Issing (1999) and de Haan and Eijffinger (2000).  By referring here to 
democratic accountability, I attempt to distinguish accountability of policy makers to democratically 
elected politicians from other mechanisms for accountability, for example accountability to the public 
through the mechanism of public opinion, achieved through the release of voting records and board minutes. 
46 De Haan and Eijffinger (2000) observe that the power of the European Parliament to alter the ECB 
statute is quite limited.  They state that they “would prefer that, in the case of the statute of the ESCB, the 
European Parliament should have the final say and thus could act as a real parliament” (p.402), but they 
don’t explain how to bring this about.   34
operationalize its mandate are likely to choose exit over the relatively ineffective option 
of voice.
47 
Making voice more attractive would require giving the European Parliament more 
power to refine the institution’s mandate and replace the president and perhaps other 
members of the board in the event of serious disagreement over objectives.
48  But there 
was a reluctance to significantly enhance the powers of the European Parliament during 
the constitutional convention process of 2003-4, reflecting majority sentiment against 
creating anything resembling a European government.  And even limited steps in that 
direction were resisted by the French and Dutch electorates in their referenda on the draft 
constitution.  This is a reminder that monetary union without political union is 
problematic.
49  Since the latter is not likely to change anytime soon, collapse of the 
former cannot be dismissed out of hand. 
 
8.  Conclusion 
  The possibility that an incumbent member of the euro area might reintroduce its 
national currency cannot be excluded.  The EU is still an entity whose residents identify 
themselves as citizens of nation states.  Differences in national history and identity imply 
differences in preferences over monetary policy.  Monetary union by its nature entails 
compromises and tradeoffs.  Member states must agree on a common monetary policy 
                                                 
47 In principle, there are alternatives to democratic accountability, as noted above.  But given the difficulty 
of modifying the central bank’s statute or ousting members of its board, reflecting the treaty-based nature 
of its structure, it can be argued that these provide an inadequate substitute. 
48 Alternatively, and less desirably in my view, this power could be delegated to another political body such 
as the Eurogroup (the group of finance ministers of the members of the euro area). 
49 As emphasized by De Grauwe (2006).   35
that in some cases is not any nation’s optimum.  By choosing to remain members, 
countries trade off the costs of a suboptimal monetary policy against other benefits.   
Where there are compromises and tradeoffs, it is possible that changes in 
circumstances may lead to a change in commitments.  A country that experiences an 
asymmetric shock may find the costs of following policies determined by the majority of 
participating member states, while tolerable previously, to be prohibitive now.  A country 
that sees its monetary-union partners appointing less inflation-averse central bankers to 
the ECB board may similarly decide that the costs of accepting the common policy, while 
previously tolerable, are now prohibitively high. 
  How formidable are the obstacles to withdrawing?  Economically, it is not clear 
which way the arguments cut.  A country contemplating exit in order to obtain the kind of 
real depreciation needed to address problems of chronic slow growth and high 
unemployment would be deterred if it thought that its efforts to engineer a real 
depreciation would be frustrated by the inflationary response of domestic wages and 
prices, or if it thought that leaving the monetary union would significantly raise its debt 
servicing costs.  But if the defector strengthens the independence of its central bank and 
the efficiency of its fiscal institutions, then it is at least conceivable that these negative 
economic effects would not obtain.   
In contrast to some other authors, I have argued that the technical and legal 
difficulties of reintroducing the national currency, while surmountable, should not be 
underestimated.  But the political domain is where the most serious obstacles to 
withdrawing reside.  A country that withdraws from Europe’s monetary union would be 
seen as disregarding its commitments to other euro area members.   Such a country would   36
not be welcomed in the meetings where the future architecture of the European Union is 
discussed and policy priorities are decided.  Insofar as member states value their 
participation in these political discussions, they would incur significant costs.  The 
“insofar” is the preceding sentence is, of course, an important caveat.  Be that as it may, 
my own assessment is that the high value that member states attach to the larger 
European project would prevent them from exiting from the monetary union except under 
the most extreme circumstances.
50 
Would defection by one country cause the general disintegration of the euro area?  
The answer, as with many things economic, is “it depends.”  For other countries 
experiencing the same economic problem, there might be a strengthened incentive to 
follow.  If Italy left owing to inadequate competitiveness and slow growth and 
depreciated its national currency against the euro, other euro area members suffering 
from inadequate competitiveness and slow growth would feel greater discomfort and a 
greater temptation to follow.  If Germany left owing to high inflation and allowed its 
national currency to appreciate against the euro, then other euro area members similarly 
uncomfortable with the rate of inflation would experience still higher import prices and 
again be more tempted to follow suit.   
But if economic problems in the defecting country were the converse of those of 
its partners in the monetary union, then the opposite conclusion might obtain: the rump 
union could be rendered more cohesive.  Similarly, if the country exiting the union had 
different preferences, independent of differences in national economic circumstances, its 
departure might make it easier for the remaining members to agree on a policy more to 
                                                 
50 This is a specific application of a general conclusion drawn by Cohen (2000), that monetary unions have 
tended to be stable when there are interwoven into a fabric of related ties.   37
their liking and render the residual union more cohesive.  The first set of effects is likely 
to be of negligible importance if the departing country is small but of greater significance 
if it is large.  The second set of effects would be independent of country size insofar as 
ECB policy is decided on the basis of one country, one vote.  
The analysis here has focused on scenarios for the next ten years.  What about 
longer horizons?  The longer the euro survives, the less likely it would seem that a 
participating country would see reintroducing its national currency as a logical treatment 
for its economic ills.  Markets adapt to the single currency, rendering attempts to tamper 
with it correspondingly more costly.  Expectations adapt to its existence: having no first-
hand experience with alternatives, residents take the existence of a European currency as 
the normal state of affairs and come to regard the reintroduction of a national currency as 
beyond the pale.  Notwithstanding the fact that it experienced a very severe asymmetric 
shock in the form of Hurricane Katrina and was disappointed by the assistance it then 
received from its partners in the U.S. currency union, the State of Louisiana did not 
contemplate abandoning the dollar and introducing its own currency, even though a sharp 
depreciation might have been appropriate for addressing some of its economic 
problems.
51   
At the same time, other developments could make the break-up of the euro area 
more likely.  There could be a diplomatic and political falling out over, say, foreign 
policy.  In a world of dirty bombs and terrorist cells, a member state could experience an 
asymmetric shock of sufficient magnitude that a dramatic real depreciation was seen as 
                                                 
51 One can object that high labor mobility between Louisiana and neighboring states obviated the need for 
such a response, but one can also argue that after nearly two centuries of currency union leaving the dollar 
area was inconceivable in any case.   38
essential and the costs of abandoning the euro were trivial in comparison.  The 
possibilities are endless.   39
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Table 1 
Determinants of Negative Opinions of the Euro, 2002-2006 





































Note: Constant term estimated but not reported.  * denotes significant at the 95 per cent level. 
 
Source: See text. 
Variable      (1) (2) (3) 
      
Inflation   0.005 0.007* 0.004* 
    (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
       
Growth   -0.005*  -0.007*  0.001 
    (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
       
2003     0.003  0.006* 
     (0.008)  (0.003) 
       
2004     0.015  0.008* 
     (0.008)  (0.003) 
       
2005     0.015  0.012* 
     (0.008)  (0.003) 
       
2006    0.026*  0.013* 
     (0.008)  (0.003) 
       
R
2   0.12  0.028  — 
       
Obs   60 60 60 
       
Random 
effects   N  N  Y   43
Table 2.  Effect of EMU and Fiscal Institutions on Credit Ratings 
(Strong Finance Minister Measure of Fiscal Institutions) 
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No Yes  No No  No 
Country Fixed 
Effects 
No No  Yes***  Yes***  Yes** 
N 462  462  462  462  451 
R
2 0.0587  0.0587  0.0587  0.4863  0.9949   44
Table 3.  Effect of EMU and Fiscal Institutions on Credit Ratings 
(IndexS2 of Fiscal Institutions) 
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No Yes  No No  No 
Country Fixed 
Effects 
No No  Yes***  Yes***  Yes* 
N 462  462  462  424  414 
R
2 0.0360  0.0360  0.0360  0.4651  0.9950   45
 Table 4.  Effect of EMU and Fiscal Institutions on Credit Ratings 
(Fiscgov Measure of Fiscal Institutions) 
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No Yes  No No  No 
Country Fixed 
Effects 
No No  Yes***  Yes***  Yes** 
N 462  462  462  462  451 
R
2 0.1517  0.1517  0.1517  0.5196  0.9949   46
 
  
Figure 1.  Public Opinion by Country 
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Figure 2.  Survey Responses in the Netherlands 
Disadvantages of the Euro in The Netherlands, 2006
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